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Abstract
Cognitive scientists, behavior geneticists, and political scientists have identified several ways in which emotions influence
political attitudes, and psychologists have shown that emotion regulation can have an important causal effect on
physiology, cognition, and subjective experience. However, no work to date explores the possibility that emotion regulation
may shape political ideology and attitudes toward policies. Here, we conduct four studies that investigate the role of a
particular emotion regulation strategy – reappraisal in particular. Two observational studies show that individual differences
in emotion regulation styles predict variation in political orientations and support for conservative policies. In the third
study, we experimentally induce disgust as the target emotion to be regulated and show that use of reappraisal reduces the
experience of disgust, thereby decreasing moral concerns associated with conservatism. In the final experimental study, we
show that use of reappraisal successfully attenuates the relationship between trait-level disgust sensitivity and support for
conservative policies. Our findings provide the first evidence of a critical link between emotion regulation and political
attitudes.
Citation: Lee JJ, Sohn Y, Fowler JH (2013) Emotion Regulation as the Foundation of Political Attitudes: Does Reappraisal Decrease Support for Conservative
Policies? PLoS ONE 8(12): e83143. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083143
Editor: Michael A Motes, Center for BrainHealth, University of Texas at Dallas, United States of America
Received May 31, 2013; Accepted October 30, 2013; Published December 18, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Lee et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This research was supported by the Graduate Seed Grant from the Center for American Political Studies (CAPS), Harvard University. The funder had no
role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: jooajulialee@fas.harvard.edu
Introduction
A large body of research suggests that political conservatives are
more likely than political liberals to express and experience
negative emotions like fear and anger [1–5]. Recent neurophys-
iological studies suggest that liberals and conservatives may differ
in the ways in which they process the information that induces
affective states. In particular, political liberalism is associated with
stronger brain activity in the dorsal region of the anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC) [6], an area that detects and regulates the
competition between cognitive and emotional processes [7,8].
Similarly, Democrats are more likely than Republicans in a risky
decision-making task to show activity in the left insula, a region
associated with emotional self-regulation [9]. In contrast, Repub-
licans show more activity than Democrats in the right amygdala, a
part of the brain that plays an important role in emotional
reactions [9]. Taken together, the accumulating empirical
evidence on neurocognitive mechanisms suggests that differences
between liberals and conservatives may stem from the way they
process and regulate negative emotions.
Importantly, conservatives are also more likely than liberals to
experience and express disgust [10–11]. Research has found that
liberals base their moral judgments on harm avoidance and a
desire for fairness, while conservatives center their judgments
around three additional concerns, such as purity, in-group loyalty,
and authority [12,13]. The finding that conservatives are more
likely to be concerned with purity suggests that disgust may be one
critical emotion distinguishing them from liberals. In fact,
experimentally manipulated disgust that is unrelated to one’s
moral and political judgments has been shown to increase punitive
moral judgments related to purity [14–16] and negative feelings
against out-group members, such as gay men [17,18]. Further,
individuals who are more sensitive to disgust at the trait-level are
more likely to self-identify as politically conservative and to vote
for the conservative party [19]. Similarly, heightened involuntary
physiological arousal to disgusting images has been found to
increase the likelihood that individuals support conservative
policies such as gay marriage and abortion and identify as
conservative [11,20]. While these studies offer a link between
support for conservative policies, political conservatism and
emotion, they imply a rather deterministic process in which an
individual’s political attitudes are a passive reflection of one’s
innate emotional and biological makeup.
Here, we test the hypothesis that individuals play a proactive
role in their experience of the world, and that this direct
experience influences their political beliefs. We explore the
possibility that there may exist fundamental differences between
liberals and conservatives not only in the way that they experience
emotions, but also in the way that they regulate emotions. Although
some of these differences may be long-lasting or innate, focusing
on the regulation of emotion rather than the experience of
emotion brings up the possibility that individuals may be able to
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e83143take control of their affective state, and thus may be able to
influence the effect of their emotions on political orientation.
Not all emotion regulation strategies, however, are the same.
Two important strategies, reappraisal and suppression, are known to
have different consequences for physiology, cognition, and
subjective experience [21]. More specifically, reappraisal can be
employed earlier than suppression, altering one’s thoughts about a
target event before any emotion occurs. On the other hand,
suppression involves concealing one’s feelings after emotion occurs.
Due to this temporal difference, reappraisal has been found to be
more effective than suppression in making individuals feel less
negative after the event [22,23] and leading to less sympathetic
nervous system arousal [23,24]. In particular, the use of
reappraisal has been shown to decrease the influence of
emotion-driven intuitions, and in turn encourage deliberative
moral judgments [25]. Thus, we reason that political attitudes are
shaped by the way one deals with emotions, by either dispositional
or situational use of reappraisal.
Individuals who use reappraisal more frequently will be more
successful at regulating the negative emotions that have been
found to increase political conservatism than those who employ
reappraisal less frequently. We first used a correlational design to
examine the relationship between self-reported emotion-regulation
styles (frequency with which individuals use reappraisal, in
particular) at the trait-level, and individual differences in political
attitudes. We view that political ideology is more likely to be
dispositional while policy support is more likely to be context-
dependent [26]. Thus, at the trait-level, we predicted that frequent
reappraisal, but not frequent suppression, is associated with
reduced support for conservative policies and a decrease in
general identification with political conservatism.
Given the strong relationship between disgust and political
attitudes [11,18,19], we expected that situational reappraisal
targeted at reducing the experience of disgust attenuates the
tendency to derive moral and political judgments from disgust. We
hypothesized that the situational use of reappraisal is less affected
by disgust inducing stimuli, and thus less likely to influence moral
intuitions based on purity-related concerns, which have been
known to increase political conservatism [14–16]. We further
hypothesized that situational reappraisal moderates the effect of
innate disgust sensitivity on support for conservative policies by
reducing the occurrence of purity-based moral judgments. We
measured both the subjective and the physiological experience of
disgust to show that the use of reappraisal (but not suppression) can
reduce disgust at the individual-level, and that this reappraisal can
carry over to affect moral and political judgments.
The Institutional Review Board at Harvard University ap-
proved all of our studies. Participants gave written informed
consent prior to the study.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1a, we examined the association between
frequent use of reappraisal and support for conservative policies.
In Experiment 1b, we further examined the possibility that
frequent use of reappraisal predicts self-identified political
conservatism.
Methods
Participants and Procedure. For Experiment 1a we
recruited 120 individuals (Mage=35.21, SDage=12.37; 50% male)
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). Participants
completed a 10-minute online survey, assessing their emotion-
regulation styles, transient mood, and support for 32 different
policies ranging from foreign immigration to gay marriage to
abortion (See Text S1). All participants were U.S. residents, and
received $0.30 for their participation.
In Experiment 1b, we recruited 199 adults (Mage=25,
SDage=4.03; 53% male) from the Boston/Cambridge area to
participate in a 15-minute survey, which was part of a series of
unrelated studies. The study took approximately one hour to
complete and participants were compensated with $20. To
minimize potential demand characteristics that may result from
participants’ expectations about the relationship between emotion,
emotion regulation, and political ideology, we gathered data at
separate stages, making it difficult for participants to guess the
research hypothesis. First, we assessed political orientation from
our study pool’s general demographic survey. Once participants
signed up specifically for our study, they completed a question-
naire assessing individual differences in state emotions and
emotion regulation styles. We then matched the responses from
the demographic survey on political orientation to our main
questionnaire on emotion regulation style.
We also included a series of questions about moral decisions at
the end of the questionnaire. However, we chose not to report the
analyses in this paper, as they are not pertinent to our core
hypotheses and do not influence our results.
Measures. In both Experiment 1a and 1b, we assessed
participants’ emotion-regulation style by asking them to indicate
the extent to which they agree with 10 items on the Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) [23]. The items were rated from
1( strongly disagree)t o7( strongly agree). ERQ measures the frequency
with which respondents use two emotion-regulation styles:
suppression (e.g., ‘‘I control my emotions by not expressing
them’’; a=0.83 in Experiment 1a, a=0.76 in Experiment 1b) and
reappraisal (e.g., ‘‘I control my emotions by changing the way I
think about the situation I’m in’’; a=0.90 in Experiment 1a,
a=0.84 in Experiment 1b).
In Experiment 1a, participants were asked to indicate their
support for 32 political issues using a 3-point scale, ranging from 1
(yes), to 2 (unsure), to 3 (no). This measure has been used to gauge
support for conservative policies [27]. The summary variable was
operationalized to indicate the extent to which one supports
conservative policies (a=0.86). We used principle components
analysis to find the one-factor solution that retained all items and
calculated regression-factor scores for each participant (See Table
S1 in Text S1 for the list of policies as well as factor analysis
results). For Experiment 1b, political orientation was measured on
a scale from 1 (very liberal)t o7( very conservative). We paired self-
reported political orientations from the pre-screening survey with
data from our demographic survey using the unique participant
ID.
Lastly, in both Experiment 1a and 1b, we asked participants to
indicate their sex, age, level of education (1= High school, 2=
Some College, 3= Associate’s Degree, 4= Bachelor’s Degree,
5= Post Grad, 6= Master’s Degree, 7= Doctoral Degree, 8=
None of the above) and monthly household income (1= None,
2= Under $60, 3=$60–499, 4=$500–999, 5=$1,000–1,999,
6=$2,000–2,999, 7=$3,000–3,999, 8=$4,000–4,999, 9=
$5,000–7,499, 10=$7,500–9,999, 11= Over $10,000, 12= Don’t
know/Prefer not to answer). Also, we assessed participants’
positive and negative affect to account for transient differences
in state emotions. We used the 12-item form of the Positive and
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) [28]. Participants indicated the
extent to which they felt a specific emotion ‘‘right now’’ using a 5-
point scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all)t o5( extremely).
Emotion Regulation and Political Attitudes
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Experiment 1a. Consistent with our hypothesis that one
specific type of emotion regulation (reappraisal) would be uniquely
related to one’s support for conservative policies, we found in
Experiment 1a that frequent reappraisal is negatively associated
with support for conservative policies (r=–0.22, p=0.01; See
Fig. 1). On the other hand, the relationship between suppression
and support for conservative policies is weak and not significant
(r=–0.03, p=0.71; See Table S2 in Text S1). In the Table S3 in
Text S1 we present results from several multiple regression
analyses to demonstrate that the relationship between emotion
regulation styles and support for conservative policies is specific to
reappraisal but not to suppression. Lastly, the negative relationship
between reappraisal and support for conservative policies was
robust to controls for key demographics, such as age, education,
income, and sex, and transient positive and negative mood.
Experiment 1b. Fig. 2 shows that participants in Experiment
1b who habitually used reappraisal were significantly less likely to
self-identify as conservative (r=–0.16, p=0.02; See Table S4 in
Text S1) than those who used suppression (r=0.15, p=0.04). After
testing for both reappraisal and suppression, only reappraisal
continued to be a significant predictor of conservatism (B=–0.22,
p=0.04). Using the same regression models in Experiment 1a, we
accounted for potential effects of key demographics and transient
mood. Even after taking these controls into account, the direction,
magnitude, and significance of the relationship between reap-
praisal and conservatism did not change (See Table S5 in Text
S1).
Taken together, these observational studies suggest that
reappraisal is negatively associated with both support for
conservative policies and self-identified political conservatism.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we designed an experiment to ascertain
whether this relationship is causal and to test whether reappraisal
can be used to regulate specific emotions, such as disgust. Instead
of asking participants to self-report how often they engage in
emotion regulation, we randomly assigned them to three different
treatments [29]. In the first treatment, we asked participants to
employ reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy. In the
second treatment, we asked them to employ suppression. In the
third treatment (the control group) we did not prompt them to use
any emotion regulation strategy.
Methods
Participants and Procedure. We recruited 139 individuals
(Mage=38.8, SDage=13.6; 56% male) from Amazon Mechanical
Turk to participate in a 20-minute online study. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: reappraisal,
suppression, and control. This manipulation allowed us to assess
the causal impact of emotional regulation strategies on disgust.
Specifically, we were interested to see whether emotion regulation
strategies can influence experience of disgust and consequently
affect concerns for purity.
The instructions for the reappraisal condition appeared as
follows:
As you view the images, please try to adopt a detached and unemotional
attitude. Or, you could think about the positive aspect of what you are
seeing. Please try to think about what you are seeing objectively, watch
all images carefully, but please try to think about what you are seeing in
such a way that you feel less negative emotion.
The instructions for the suppression condition appeared as
follows:
As you view the images, if you have any feelings, please try your best not
to let those feelings show. Watch all images carefully, but try to behave
so that someone watching you would not know that you are feeling
anything at all.
In the control condition, participants were asked to carefully
observe a series of images.
After reading the instructions, participants in all three condi-
tions were presented with seven photos of disgusting stimuli, such
as a cockroach or a dirty toilet, taken from the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS) [30]. The images appeared for 7
seconds, followed by 3-second rest period. Previous studies have
used these images to induce disgust reliably [17,31]. None of the
images had any relevance to moral judgment or political attitudes.
Next, participants were asked to answer questions regarding the
factors that they take into account when making moral decisions,
transient mood, and standard demographic questions. As a
manipulation check, we asked participants to recall their
instructions and choose the one strategy they actually employed.
Out of the 139 participants, 2 participants in the reappraisal
condition and 15 participants in the suppression condition
reported that they used the incorrect emotion regulation strategy.
Therefore, we excluded these 17 participants from further analysis,
as they did not understand the instructions or did not follow the
instructions correctly [32]. Thus, a total of 122 participants were
included in the analysis (43 reappraisers, 32 suppressors, and 47
controls).
Measures. We used the shortened Moral Foundations
Questionnaire (16-item MFQ Part I) [33] to assesse the relevance
of various principles on moral decision-making. This scale yielded
scores on five distinct foundations of morality: harm (a=0.82),
fairness (a=0.83), loyalty (a=0.80), authority (a=0.70), and
purity (a=0.67).
Also, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which
they felt various emotions at the moment. This allowed us to test
whether disgust stimuli influenced self-reported negative feelings,
including disgust. Using the same PANAS measure as in
Figure 1. Chronic reappraisal is negatively associated with self-
reported political conservatism, Experiment 1 (shaded area
=95% CI).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083143.g001
Emotion Regulation and Political Attitudes
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repulsed, nauseated) and observed the following summary
variables: post-stimuli negative affect (a=0.82), and post-stimuli
disgust (a=0.87).
Results
In the Text S1, we report the descriptive statistics of the main
variables and their zero-order correlations (See Table S6 in Text
S1). Experiment 2 revealed that perceived disgust from the
negative stimuli differed across emotion regulation strategies, F(2,
109)=3.61, p=0.03 (Fig. 3). A planned contrast revealed that
participants in the reappraisal condition were significantly less
disgusted (M=–0.40, SD=0.40) than were those in the control
condition (M=0.13, SD=1.06), p=0.03. Also, participants’
ratings of purity as a relevant moral concern (i.e., whether one
takes purity and decency into account when making judgment
about right and wrong) differed significantly across the emotion
regulation strategies, F(2, 111)=3.59, p=0.03. Participants in the
reappraisal condition were less likely to perceive purity concerns as
relevant to their moral judgment (M=–0.38, SD=0.91) than were
those in the control condition (M=0.15, SD=1.04), p=0.05.
Interestingly, we did not observe any statistically significant
difference in other concerns for morality (harm, fairness, loyalty,
and respect) across the three emotion regulation conditions,
although similar patterns appeared for loyalty and respect (p.0.52
for all contrasts).
Lastly, we tested the hypothesis that the relationship between
reappraisal and purity as a moral foundation may be explained by
one’s subjective feelings of disgust, and not by negative affect in
general (all negative items that exclude disgust-related items). In
support of this hypothesis, we found that when self-reported
disgust was included as a predictor of purity concerns, the effect of
reappraisal on purity concerns was no longer statistically
significant (changing from B=20.62, SE=0.27, p=0.02 to
B=20.43, SE=0.27, p=0.11). However, disgust significantly
predicted purity (B=0.27, SE=0.11, p=0.01). A Sobel test
indicated that the reduction in regression weight was statistically
significant (Z=21.90, p=0.05). A bootstrap analysis confirmed
that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the
indirect effect excluded zero (20.38, 20.01). General feelings of
negative affect, however, did not mediate the effect of reappraisal
on purity concerns.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 tests the hypothesis that reappraisal can influence
the relationship between innate disgust sensitivity and support for
conservative policies. Following the same procedure as in
Experiment 2, we randomly assigned participants to one of the
three conditions (reappraisal, suppression, and control) and
exposed them to identical disgust inducing images. However, in
this study, we first measured dispositional sensitivity toward disgust
before presenting the disgust images. In addition to the measures
of purity concerns used in Experiment 2, we introduced an
assessment of support for conservative policies.
Importantly, we also assessed the efficacy of reappraisal in
regulating negative physiological arousal. Previous research using
electrocardiography methods has found that disgust triggers a
parasympathetic autonomic response and is characterized by a
decelerated heart rate. Fear and anger, on the other hand,
produce mostly a sympathetic response, and are associated with an
accelerated heart rate [34,35].
Methods
Participants and Procedure. We recruited 112 individuals
(Mage=35.42, SDage=14.05; 61% male) to participate in a
computer-based survey in our laboratory. During the study,
participants wore non-invasive electrodes that measured heart
rate. As in Experiment 2, we randomly assigned participants to
one of three treatment groups (reappraisal, suppression, and no
emotion regulation). The instructions and disgust inducing images
remained unchanged from Experiment 2. Moreover, we expanded
on Experiment 2 by analyzing the relationship between disposi-
Figure 2. Chronic reappraisal is negatively associated with support for conservative policies, Experiment 2 (shaded area =95% CI).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083143.g002
Emotion Regulation and Political Attitudes
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conservative policies.
Before enrolling in this study, participants were required to
complete an online survey containing demographic and health-
related questions. This allowed us to determine whether partic-
ipants were over the age of 18 and were registered to vote in the
United States. We also assessed whether participants held political
attitudes that fell in between liberalism and conservatism and
whether they had any health conditions that could affect their
physiological responses. All participants received $10 for their
participation.
Once we checked physiological signals, we instructed partici-
pants to begin the study. The first task consisted of a relaxing, two-
minute video. This allowed us to measure baseline physiological
activities. Next, participants completed a task that assessed their
sensitivity to disgust. They were then randomly assigned to one of
the three conditions (reappraisal, suppression, and control) [29].
We then asked questions related to moral foundations, as well as
policy preferences.
Lastly, participants completed a standard demographic ques-
tionnaire and a manipulation check. Seven participants in the
reappraisal condition, and 15 participants in the suppression
condition failed to use the emotion regulation strategy that they
were assigned, and were thus excluded from further analysis [32].
Thus, a total of 90 participants were included in the analysis (26
reappraisers, 31 suppressors, and 33 controls).
Measures. We measured participants’ propensity to feel
disgusted (DS, a=0.88) [36]. Because the DS score remains
stable over time, it has been found to be a good predictor of one’s
behavioral willingness to engage in disgusting actions [37]. In Part
I, participants rated their agreement with 14 statements (e.g., ‘‘It
would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body’’) on a scale
from 1 (strongly disagree)t o5( strongly agree). In Part II, participants
rated 13 statements (e.g., ‘‘You are walking barefoot on concrete,
and you step on an earthworm’’) on their perceived disgust using a
scale from 1 (not disgusting at all)t o5( extremely disgusting).
In Experiment 3, we replaced the self-report measures of disgust
with electrocardiography methods. This served to reduce self-
report bias, and to track participants’ emotional state closely and
continuously (See Text S1). We used the 28-item MFQ (both Part
I and II) [33] to assess participants’ attitude toward moral
principles. These measures included harm (a=0.59), fairness
(a=0.66), loyalty (a=0.63), authority (a=0.63), and purity
(a=0.74). As before we used the 32-item measure to indicate
the extent of support for conservative policies (a=0.83) [27].
Results
In the Text S1, we report the descriptive statistics of the main
variables and their zero-order correlations (See Table S7 in Text
S1). We first confirmed whether reappraisal mitigated the
physiological effect of observing disgusting images using a mixed
ANOVA, with heart rate as the dependent variable, time (baseline
vs. disgust period) as the within-subjects factor, and type of
emotion regulation strategy (reappraisal vs. suppression vs. no
strategy employed) as the between-subjects factor. Our hypothesis
was confirmed. We observed a significant decrease of heart rate
over time, F(1, 86)=6.27, p=0.01, gr
2
=0.07. Although there was
no significant difference in mean heart rate across emotion
regulation strategies, F(2, 86)=0.48, p=0.62, there was a
significant interaction between the type of emotion regulation
strategy used and heart rate over time, F(2, 86)=3.00, p=0.05,
gr
2
=0.06. That is, changes in heart rate depended on the emotion
regulation strategy that participants had been randomly assigned.
In particular, a planned contrast revealed that the heart rate for
reappraisers did not decrease significantly from time =T1
(M=74.75, SD=14.98) to time =T2 (M=74.33, SD=15.50),
Figure 3. Effects of different emotion-regulation strategies used in Experiment 3. (A) Reappraisal significantly reduced post-stimuli
disgust. (B) Reappraisal reduced concerns for purity as moral foundation (Error bars reflect SEM).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083143.g003
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significantly for both suppressors and controls; for suppressors,
heart rate decreased from T1 (M=74.47, SD=13.18) to T2
(M=70.67, SD=10.81), p=0.02, d=0.31, and for controls heart
rate decreased from T1 (M=73.60, SD=10.63) to T2 (M=70.57,
SD=9.72), p=0.003, d=0.30. This confirms the hypothesis that
reappraisal not only reduces subjective feelings of disgust, but also
attenuates physiological reactions to disgusting stimuli.
Next, we tested the moderation hypothesis: the relationship
between innate disgust sensitivity and support for conservative
policies depends on the use of reappraisal. As predicted, a
significant interaction between disgust sensitivity and support for
conservative policies was found (B=20.61, SE=0.26, p=0.02).
These tests also accounted for potential correlations with standard
demographic variables (see Table S8 in Text S1). Fig. 4 shows that
when reappraisal was not used, the relationship between disgust
sensitivity and support for conservative policies was statistically
significant, B=0.82, SE=0.26, p=0.003. However, when reap-
praisal was employed, the effect was not significant, B=0.25,
SE=0.13, p=0.06. This finding suggests that reappraisal has an
important role in attenuating the effect of disgust sensitivity on
political attitudes.
Building on the Experiment 2 result that reappraisal of disgust
decreased concerns for purity as a moral foundation, we tested a
related hypothesis in Experiment 3 that the interaction between
disgust sensitivity and reappraisal may also predict concerns for
purity, which is a potential mechanism that explains how
reappraisal and disgust sensitivity are related to support for
conservative policies (see Table S9 in Text S1). Fig. 5 shows the
results of a complete model of moderated mediation [38], which
examined whether purity concerns continue to mediate the
relationship between disgust sensitivity and support for conserva-
tive policies when reappraisal was used or not used. Reappraisal
significantly attenuated the association between disgust sensitivity
and purity concerns (d=21.07, SE=0.37, p=0.005) but had no
statistically significant effect on purity concerns and support for
conservative policies (e=20.01, SE=0.19, p=0.96). When we
accounted for purity concerns, disgust sensitivity no longer
predicted support for conservative policies (c9=0.01, SE=0.14,
p=0.97), but purity did (b=0.72, SE=0.10, p,0.001). A Sobel
test indicated that the reduction in the regression weight (cRc9)
was statistically significant (Z=22.83, p=0.005). Also as shown in
Fig. 4, the indirect effect of disgust sensitivity on support for
conservative policies was statistically significant only when
reappraisal was not employed (c=20.55, SE=0.17, p=0.002)
but not significant when reappraisal was employed (c=20.23,
SE=0.21, p=0.29). In addition, a bootstrap analysis consisting of
1,000 samples confirmed that the 95% bias-corrected confidence
intervals excluded zero in all of the significant paths presented in
Fig. 5. Together, these results suggest that reappraisal may
interfere with the process by which one forms moral intuitions,
especially those related to purity, and thus may weaken the
relationship between felt disgust and support for conservative
policies. In other words, when disgust-prone individuals employ
reappraisal, they may be less likely to form moral and political
intuitions from their experience of disgust.
General Discussion
In the last decade, a wide variety of research has indicated that
genetic variation plays an important role in explaining the
variation in political attitudes [39–44]. For example, attitudes
toward certain political issues, such as abortion and gay rights,
may be partially biologically inherited from parents [42], and fear
dispositions and attachment also significantly predict political
preferences toward out-group members [44].
An interesting possibility, then, is that liberals and conservatives
may also exhibit biological differences in the way they deal with
emotionally-arousing situations. Emerging evidence in neurophys-
iology has shown that being liberal is associated with having a
larger anterior cingulate cortex (an area that regulates emotional
processes) and stronger brain activity in this region [6,7,45].
Here, we show that both political ideology and support for
policies are associated with the trait-based use of emotion-
Figure 4. The relationship between disgust sensitivity and
support for conservative policies depends on whether reap-
praisal is employed or not, Experiment 4. Simple slopes analysis
demonstrates that when reappraisal is not used, the relationship
between disgust sensitivity and support for conservative policies is
statistically significant, B=0.76, p=0.004, but when reappraisal is
employed, the effect is attenuated, B=0.20, p=0.55.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083143.g004
Figure 5. A model of moderated mediation shows that
reappraisal attenuates the otherwise robust relationship
between disgust sensitivity and purity concerns, thus leading
to less support for conservative policies, Experiment 4. All
values are regression coefficients. Purity variable consists of the items
that suggest purity as a moral concern. Solid lines indicate significant
paths and dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. *p,0.05,
**p,0.01, ***p,0.001. c indicates the conditional indirect effect of
disgust sensitivity on support for conservative policies, whereas c9
indicates direct effect. (R) and (NR) denote reappraisal and non-
reappraisal conditions respectively. Binary indicator variable for
suppression was entered as a covariate. All beta coefficients (a through
e) are unstandardized. Standard errors, p-values, and 95% confidence
intervals for the corresponding coefficient estimates are as follows.
a=0.75, SE=0.64, p,0.001. b=0.72, SE=0.10, p,0.001. c=20.23 (R),
SE=0.21, p=0.29, (20.65, 0.29). c=0.55 (NR), SE=0.17, p=0.002, (0.25,
0.91). c9=0.01, SE=0.14, p=0.97, (20.29, 0.28). d=21.07, SE=0.37,
p=0.005. e=20.01, SE=0.19, p=0.96.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083143.g005
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that an emotion-regulation strategy can influence both emotional
reactions and preference for conservative policies (Studies 2 and 3).
In particular, the use of reappraisal not only reduces the
psychological and physiological experience of disgust, but also
buffers the effect of trait-based disgust sensitivity on purity-based
moral judgments and support for conservative policies (Experi-
ment 3). These results suggest that while political attitudes may be
rooted in biologically inherited processes that influence the way we
experience emotion, they are also malleable, as reappraisal is a
strategy that can be learned.
An intriguing question remains whether members of a
population can employ systematic efforts to promote reappraisal
in order to become more politically tolerant of an out-group (such
as sexual, ethnic, and religious minorities) over time. Our findings
reveal a specific pattern highlighting the role of regulating disgust,
suggesting that reappraisal may attenuate purity-related moral
concerns and political attitude. This may in turn influence
attitudes on controversial political issues such as immigration
and gay marriage. In support of this finding, training individuals in
reappraisal strategies in the context of the Israeli - Palestinian
conflict has been found to reduce anger in conflict situations and
increase preference for conciliatory solutions over aggressive
policies [46,47]. In addition, the use of reappraisal enabled
individuals to reduce political intolerance of out-group members
by decreasing negative emotions and increasing democratic values
[48].
While previous research has focused on reappraising negative
emotions towards an out-group, our study is the first to
demonstrate that reappraising incidental disgust, an emotion
which is unrelated to subsequent moral and political judgments,
plays an important role in reducing support for conservative
policies. Our method clearly isolated the effects of disgust
reappraisal, reducing the influence of incidental disgust on support
for conservative policies. Notably, our findings indicate that both
the subjective and physiological experiences of disgust can be
successfully alleviated with targeted reappraisal. This suggests that
regulating incidental disgust reduces a psychologically aversive
state, which in turn alters one’s attitudes toward for conservative
policies.
In this study, we focused on one pathway through which
individuals may override the effect of emotions on political
attitudes: disgust reappraisal in terms of trait sensitivity and
situational experience. However, disgust may be one of many
emotions that can affect the development of moral intuitions and
shape support for conservative policies. Thus, we suggest that
disgust reappraisal is one of many potential mechanisms behind
emotion, emotion regulation, and conservatism. Our model does
not suggest that a single use of reappraisal would change deep-
seated ideology; instead, our data indicates that successful
regulation of incidental disgust may at least temporarily change
one’s political disposition by reducing the tendency to form moral
intuitions based on purity concerns. Future research should
explore the effect of regulation on other emotions, like empathy,
over which applying some degree of self-control may alter both
moral judgments and political attitudes.
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